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Climate Geoengineering Governance (CCG) 
Climate Geoengineering Governance (http://geoengineering-governance-
research.org) is a research project which aims to provide a timely basis for the 
governance of geoengineering through robust research on the ethical, legal, 
social and political implications of a range of geoengineering approaches. It is 
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AHRC) - grant ES/J007730/1  
 
CGG Working Papers 
The CGG Working Paper series is designed to give a first public airing to a wide 
range of papers broadly related to the project’s themes.  Papers published in this 
series may be, but are not necessarily, early outputs from the project team; 
equally they may be from other authors, and reflect different perspectives and 
different issues from those directly pursued by the project itself.  The aim is to 
promote vigorous and informed debate, in a spirit of pluralism. 
What the working papers have in common is that they will all be at an early 
stage of development, prior to full publication.  Comment and response, at any 
level of detail, is therefore doubly welcome.  Please send all responses in the 
first instance to the authors themselves - each paper contains a correspondence 
address.  We will be looking for opportunities to use the website or other project 
activities to give a wider airing to any dialogues and debates that develop 
around a paper or issue.  
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Abstract 
 
The prospect of solar geoengineering in response to climate change (on the 
basis of its supposedly significantly lower cost and/or more rapid impact on 
global temperature than carbon reduction strategies) raises a number of 
security concerns that have traditionally been understood within a standard 
Geo-political framing of security. This relates to unrealistic direct 
application in inter-State warfare or to a securitization of climate change. 
However, indirect security implications are potentially significant. Current 
capability, security threats and international law loopholes suggest the 
military, rather than scientists would undertake geoengineering, and solar 
radiation management (SRM) in particular. SRM activity would be covered 
by Critical National Infrastructure policies, and as such would require a 
significant level of secondary security infrastructure. Concerns about 
termination effects, the need to impose international policy agreement 
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(given the ability of 'rogue States' to disrupt SRM and existing difficulties in 
producing global agreement on climate policy), and a world of extreme 
weather events, where weather is engineered and hence blameworthy 
rather than natural, suggest these costs would be large. Evidence on how 
blame is attributed suggest blame for extreme weather events may be 
directed towards more technologically advanced nations, (such as the USA) 
even if they are not engaged in geoengineering. From a security 
perspective SRM is costly, ungovernable, and raises security concerns of a 
sufficient magnitude to make it a non-viable policy option. 
 
1. Introduction  
In recent years, as concern over climate change has increased, geoengineering 
has emerged as a policy option that is increasingly taken seriously (IPCC, 2013; 
Crutzen, 2006). While a range of technologies are captured by the category of 
geoengineering, only solar radiation management, and specifically stratospheric 
aerosol injection is generally accepted to be a technically feasible means of 
impacting on global temperatures in a relatively short time period, and hence is 
our focus here. Increased interest in geoengineering has been partly driven by 
perceptions that it o_ers a way of addressing climate change at a significantly 
lower cost than alternatives. However, these estimates of future costs have been 
criticized for their lack of realism as they only focus on direct costs (MacKerron, 
2014). High fixed cost, capital intensive technologies like geoengineering are 
characterised by both significant uncertainties and cognitive biases that tend to 
under-estimate their future costs (ibid). 
 
Major technical systems typically require extended secondary support-ing 
technologies, systems, and governance structures which will only become 
apparent as technologies progress from imagined ideas to implemented real-
world technologies. At present geoengineering remains an imaginary idea, not 
yet at the proof of concept stage, with an inherent danger that assumptions 
about its social impact will be biased. At early stages of technology 
development, expectations of costs are typically based on extrapolating from 
existing systems. This is subject to survivor bias, as most early-stage 
technologies fail, making the successes atypical and biasing perceptions of 
economic and social costs downwards. 
 
Early stage evaluation of the social distribution of costs and benefits (risks and 
rewards) is therefore subject to very large uncertainties. Given the speculative 
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nature of impacts, the approach of this paper is to highlight some previously 
overlooked indirect security concerns, and evaluate their 
magnitudes based on assumptions about the stability of security policy over the 
next 40 or so years. Doing so suggests the indirect economic and social costs of 
the security infrastructure that is likely to be needed to enable SRM will be 
considerable. This is based on four assumptions: 
1. Rather than scientists being in charge of geoengineering, as is often 
implicitly assumed, the military are likely to play a significant role given current 
capability, the securitisation of climate change, perceived termination risks and 
loop-holes that exist in international legal frameworks that will constrain non-
military developments. Given current US security policy and doctrine it is 
unlikely that the US Congress would allow non-US control over geoengineering 
activity.  
2. SRM activity would be likely to be classified as Critical National 
Infrastructure and subject to a range of security requirements that would 
potentially be very costly.  
3. The costs of this security infrastructure would depend on its temporal 
scope, geographic scope, and level of intensity. The temporal scope could 
potentially be many hundreds of years. The geographic scope could be global 
given the limited political ability of governments to agree on climate change 
policy and the ability of 'rogue' States to easily counteract any geoengineering 
efforts. The intensity could be very high because of perceptions of risks from the 
termination effect, and if geoengineering is imposed and subject to resistance, 
particularly if that resistance takes a violent form and is directed towards soft 
targets.  
4. The intensity of global security provision is likely to be further in-creased 
given the inevitable extreme weather events that will occur around the world 
during its operation. Once SRM is in operation these will often be seen as 
engineered outcomes rather than random events, and hence sub-ject to a moral 
calculus of blame. Individuals and groups may take revenge against the citizens 
and interests of the States perceived to be involved.  
Together these four assumptions suggest that the magnitude of the social and 
economic costs of security for geoengineering may be extremely high, and 
arguably significantly higher than the direct costs. The political costs may also 
be very high given the combination of security concerns and could imply a 
dystopian future.  
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2. Direct and Indirect Security Concerns  
 
In discussing security implications of geoengineering it is important to clarify 
some key distinctions and terminology in order to avoid con_ating the dis-
tinction between hostile and peaceful activities with the distinction between 
military and civilian activity. War is organised violence threatened or under-
taken for political purposes. War reflects a relationship between belligerents, 
who are not necessarily states with organised military forces (Gray, 2010: 37). 
Warfare is the conduct of organised violence in war, and typically car-ried out by 
militaries, but also by non-State actors (Kaldor, 2000). Military activity however 
also includes a wide range of activities that are not hostile. For example, 
transportation, medical care and logistics. Security is a state of being free of 
danger or its threat, and hence has dimensions related to who is free of the 
threat - traditionally States, but increasingly individuals - and what those threats 
are - traditionally military hostility but increasingly non-military threats such as 
climate change. 
Military capability can address threats both directly, and indirectly (for example 
through deterrence) and can be applied to protect different kinds of actors from 
a variety of threats. Technologies that underpin these military capabilities can in 
some instances be dual use. In the arms control arena, dual use refers to the 
features of technologies that enable them to be applied to both hostile and 
peaceful ends with few or no modifications (Molas-Gallart and Robinson, 1997) 
while in the economic sphere it applies to technologies that can be applied in 
both military and civilian settings. 
Given these distinctions it should be clear that the security implications of 
geoengineering go beyond direct application of dual use geoengineering 
technologies for hostile activity within a war setting. If geoengineering tech-
nologies worked, they could potentially be used by the military for non-hostile 
activity, for example in humanitarian interventions. Moreover, the security 
implications of geoengineering also address how it might mitigate or enhance 
wider threats. Indirect security concerns covers both the security infrastructure 
that would be needed to protect geoengineering projects from external threats, 
and the security concerns that this security infrastructure might it-self endanger. 
In the next two sub-sections we contrast direct and indirect security concerns. 
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2.1 Direct Military Use  
Interest in the direct military use of geo-engineering and other weather 
modification technologies has a long history (Fleming, 2006; 2010), going back 
to Francis Bacon's prediction that one day science would allow control of the 
weather (1606). Langmuir's discovery in the 1940s that silver iodide could be 
used to seed clouds generated a range of military projects, which expanded 
considerably in the 1950s with military backing. In 1958 the NSF became the 
lead agency for research into weather modification. 
The 1950s were characterised by a shift in the scale at which military plan-ners 
and weapons developers thought, generating suggestions for approaches to 
military engagement with global impacts. Of these nuclear weapons remained 
the most viable, particularly mass air-burst weapons with the potential to 
generate firestorms that would have a global impact. However, there was 
interest in using cloud seeding techniques to address natural threats, such as 
hurricanes. This, for example, was addressed in project Cirrus which ran from 
1947 to 1952 (Havens, 1952). 
While there was considerable interest in the military application of weather 
modification, the technology was plagued by uncertainty about its impact. The 
inherently unpredictable nature of the weather made it impossible to predict 
counter-factual outcomes of what the weather would have been like without an 
intervention. Hence it is impossible to robustly assess the im-pact, or lack of 
impact, of weather modification measures. For example project Stormfury, 
funded by the US Navy and US department of Commerce ran from 1962 to 
1983, and attempted to modify hurricanes using cloud seeding techniques. The 
impacts were inconclusive because of the difficul-ties of determining the effects 
caused by the treatment in the absence of a solid understanding of outcomes 
under the counter factual untreated scenario (Cairns, 2014; Willoughby et al. 
1982, p.411). 
Nonetheless, the US military applied such techniques during the Vietnam war 
and operated a secret cloud seeding program, codenamed Popeye, over North 
and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from 1967 to 1972. The aim was to 
extend the rainy season and disrupt the flows of logistics along the Ho Chi Minh 
trail by flying over 2,600 cloud seeding sorties using 47,000 silver iodide flares. 
Trials of Popeye began in Laos in 1966 and were extended in the 'Motorpool' 
operational phase in 1967 (McLeish, 2014). The operation was exposed by Jack 
Anderson in his Washington Post column in 1971, followed by a article in Science 
in June and then in 1972 an extended article by Hersh (1972) in the New York 
Times. 
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The exposure led to a Senate investigation, the unilateral decision by the US to 
renounce the military application of climate modification techniques in 1972 and 
the passing of a resolution urging President Nixon to begin international 
negotiations to ban the practice. This eventually led to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (ENMOD), negotiated in parallel with the SALT negotiations. Bilateral 
discussions started in 1974, identical texts were issued in 1975, which were 
finalised on the 10th December 1975. ENMOD entered into force on 5 October 
1978 and prohibits the hostile use of environmental modification techniques that 
have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, 
damage or injury to any other State Party. 
The legal ban on the use of weather modification techniques for hostile (but not 
peaceful purposes) in the Treaty, as well as the limited effective-ness and 
significant uncertainty about whether such techniques have any meaningful 
impact have lessened military interest in weather modification. Funding fell to 
$500,000 by the 1990s, but in 2003 the NRC (2003) called for increased 
research, and in 2008 the Department for Homeland Security convened a 
workshop on weather modification to address national security threats (i.e. 
hurricanes). 
While weather modification programmes remain extensive in China (Xueliang, 
2009; Edney, & Symons, 2013), in the West there is limited practical military 
interest given the uncertainties involved and the existence of cheaper, more 
effective solutions to all the potential applications of weather modification 
techniques in a military setting. In the 1960s unguided munitions were 
extremely inaccurate and muddying up the Ho Chi Minh trail with additional rain 
may have seemed a viable option. Today with guided munitions, battlefield 
surveillance and improved vehicles, the application of weather modification 
seems a quaint historical dead end. 
Despite this lack of interest, increased attention to geoengineering in the 
scientific community has seen an increase in the attention given to the mil-itary 
use of weather modification techniques on a greater than local scale (Foreign 
Affairs, 2012). Such applications are banned by an international convention, 
have limited military use (Briggs, 2013) given the inherent un-predictability of 
weather systems, (caused by the laws of physics and hence not amenable to 
change by technology), and compete against cheaper, more effective alternative 
means of achieving the same military ends. 1 
 
1For a related argument see 
http://geoengineeringourclimate.com/2013/10/01/is-geoengineering-a-national-
security-risk-opinion-article/ 
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3. Indirect Security Implications  
 
While the direct relevance of solar geoengineering to security settings is 
probably minimal (despite significant funding) the indirect security implications 
may well be considerable. A first point to highlight is that the widespread 
assumption that geoengineering will be undertaken by scientists is questionable. 
Instead there are a number of reasons for thinking that the military rather than 
scientists will run solar geoengineering projects. 
The first reason relates to capability, and the experience the military has of 
running large complex technical projects. Existing weather modification 
programmes in China for example exploit artillery and rockets, both tech-
nologies with military applications that are under the PLA's control. 
A second reason relates to the increasing securitisation of climate change policy, 
where geoengineering is seen as a solution to a wider climate change problem 
which is itself framed as a security problem. For example the UK MOD, the UN 
(2007; 2011), the RUSI and the US (CNA, 2007) see climate change as a 
security threat (see also Campbell, et al 2007; Clapper, 2014). The underlying 
assumption is that climate change can destabilize weakened and failing 
governments, leading to conflicts, mass migrations, ethnic ten-sion and 
extremism (see Homer-Dixon, 1991, and in a more apocalyptic tone Kaplan 
1994). However, the supposed direct links between scarcity and insecurity are 
more complex and context dependent than this literature suggests (Eastin, et al 
2011) making the link to geoengineering unclear. A related body of research 
frames the security threat of climate change in terms of human security rather 
than traditional inter-state security, arguing that geoengineering may be a 
responsible approach to address the security threats to individuals posed by 
major changes in climate. In each instance a security framing directs policy 
implementation towards military settings. 
A third reason relates to exemptions and sovereign immunity clauses based on 
national security concerns in international law. These provide ways of avoiding 
legal constraints on geoengineering activity that would apply to non-military 
activity. 
A fourth reason relates to current US security policy and doctrine, whereby it is 
extremely unlikely that Congress would approve the development of 
geoengineering systems under United Nations or other international organi-
sation's control. Moreover, given the perceived risks of a potential termination 
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effect, it is also unlikely that Congress would accept another State, such as 
China, or group of States, such as the EU, producing technological systems 
whose failure could pose a catastrophic risk to the US. 
Since the 1950s US foreign policy has been characterised by a set of norms that 
sees the US as taking a leadership role in security matters, with a unique 
responsibility for deciding and enforcing those norms (Bacevich, 2010). These 
norms are enforced through a mix of soft and hard power, with the US 
negotiating from a position of strength based on a level of distributed military 
resources, structured for interventionist global power projection, far in excess of 
all other nations combined. US military policy divides the world up into unified 
commands - Pacific, Central, European, Africa, Southern, Northern, Space and 
Strategic - structured for intervention and acting to prevent the emergence of 
competing powers in any region. A key part of this, involves acting to prevent 
the development of military capabilities that might threaten US interests, by 
States unaligned with US norms. 
In the security domain, perceptions of threats, which can be highly un-certain 
and unlikely, play important roles in policy. The perceptions that geoengineering 
would create a potential doomsday device, which if stopped would rapidly lead to 
a catastrophic 'termination effect', could easily be per-ceived to present a threat 
to US security. Under such circumstances it would be reasonable to assume that 
there would be considerable US security inter-est and a desire to have it under 
US security control or at least subject to considerable oversight. The notion that 
North Korea, Iran, Russia, China or even the EU could develop a geoengineering 
capability without generating concern in Washington is unrealistic. 
Lastly, given the perceived (or constructed) risks of termination, geoengi-
neering is likely to be geographically distributed to spread risks. This again 
suggests military involvement, particularly given the geographic scope of US 
military assets and the ability of military organisations to ease deployment 
because of their exemptions to legal restrictions on international action. 
 
3.0.1 Critical national infrastructure  
Even if the military are not directly involved in stratospheric aerosol injection 
related geoengineering activity, they are likely to take a security interest in it. 
Geoengineering, if carried out, will be classified as "Critical Infrastructure", 
defined as systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital that the 
incapacity or destruction of such may have a debilitating impact on the security, 
economy, public health or safety, environment, or any combination of those 
matters, across any Federal, State, regional, territorial, or local jurisdiction_ 
(NIPP, 2013, see also Critical Infrastructures Protection Act, 2001). 
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Currently policy to secure infrastructure was Partnering for Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience. It involves managing risks in a partnerships between 
owners and operators; Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; 
regional entities; non-profit organizations; and academia using an integrated 
approach to identify, deter, detect, disrupt, and prepare for threats and hazards, 
reduce vulnerabilities, and mitigate consequences (NIPP 2013, page 1). 
set up in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and upgraded in Presidential Policy 
Directive 21 (PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience and is 
outlined in NIPP 2013: 
 
The main focus on threats relates to terrorism, pandemics, cyber attacks, 
extreme weather and accidents or technical failures. These are understood using 
a traditional threat, vulnerability, consequences framework. Within this 
framework threats relate to natural or man made occurrence, individual, entity, 
or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, 
the environment, and/or property (NIPP, 2013 pg. 17). These are then 
prioritized in relation to how vulnerable infrastructure systems are to them, and 
what the consequences might be if those vulnerabilities were exploited. 
Consequently, assessing the security requirements for geoengineering in-
frastructure requires assessing vulnerabilities and consequences. In relation to 
consequences these are large as the termination effect presents a major threat. 
Once geoengineering was in place for decades, stopping the activity could lead 
to a rapid increase in global temperatures, which in turn could lead to significant 
environmental impacts that would threaten not just US economic interests, but 
the survival of its society (Jones et al 2013). On a consequences ranking, 
geoengineering would score highly, and would require comprehensive risk 
management that mapped out and explored vulnerabilities in the elements of 
the wider technological systems it was embedded in. Moreover, given the 
systems would have to operate for many hundreds of years, a larger set of 
environmental and systemic uncertainties and 'unknown unknowns' would likely 
be explored. 
Moving to vulnerabilities, it may be the case that direct vulnerabilities would be 
no more than those faced by a traditional military facility and could be managed 
in the same way. Resiliance to catastrophic failure could be built in through 
redundancy, replication, back-up facilities etc. It is hard to see how any direct 
threats could not be managed by organisations that are capable of dealing with 
the protection of nuclear weapons. 
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However, geoengineering activity is very vulnerable to counter-measures. For 
example, if a country disagreed with either geoengineering or the end-points 
that the climate was being geo-engineered to it could easily disrupt existing 
programmes. For example, Russia may disagree with India about what 
temperature rise should be aimed at and both might disagree with the USA. 
Russia might then disrupt geoengineering efforts by venting methane into the 
atmosphere from oil and gas deposits, or by releasing greenhouse gases, which 
could be done in ways that would be potentially difficult to detect. The scope of 
surveillance to deter, detect and prevent this activity could therefore potentially 
be extremely large and costly as it would have to cover not just existing political 
actors but also political actors that may emerge in the future. 
The costs of security would rise with the extent to which geoengineering 
measures were imposed because of failure to agree globally. We have already 
mentioned the potential for regional tensions about end points, and the need to 
constrain countermeasures, but the implementation of geoengi-neering would 
require either a degree of international agreement or unilateral implementation 
and imposition. Given the very limited ability of the global community to agree 
on climate policy, it is not clear that a consensus will emerge. The impacts of 
geoengineering activity on local weather is extremely poorly understood 
(Trenberth and Dai, 2007) including on local precipitation patterns (Hegerl and 
Solomon, 2008; Ferraro, et al 2014). States' activity under conditions of 
uncertainty will be subject to moral hazard and reaching agreement will be 
potentially costly. It is unfortunate that a plan to deal with a failure to achieve a 
global climate policy consensus, itself re-quires a global climate policy consensus 
that will be arguably more difficult to achieve. 
If global consensus on end points and governance cannot be achieved, questions 
arise about the extent to which countries can veto activity that will directly 
influence their climate. Would countries be ignored? particularly given their 
ability to use countermeasures. Would geoengineering be imposed on parts of 
the world without their agreement or in direct oppo-sition to their clearly 
expressed preferences? If so, the security threats to geoengineering activity 
would be higher and the scope and intensity of security infrastructure would 
increase. Implementing geoengineering under such conditions will increase the 
social and political commitment required, which, in turn, has the potential to 
generate lock-in to costly governance structures and security infrastructure 
(Rayner et al 2013). 
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3.0.2  The geography of blame  
 
A key influence on potential threats relates to the number of people, organ-
isations and States that wish to disrupt geoengineering and the intensity of 
those aims. A key issue that has been often overlooked in geoengineering 
debates is how geoengineering might itself change people's feelings towards it. 
Extreme weather events can be very disruptive, but are currently seen as 
naturally occurring and therefore outside the moral calculus of blame. How-ever, 
if the climate is being engineered, then weather may cease to be seen as 
natural, and instead be seen as the result of deliberate interventions. If this is 
the case, it becomes blameworthy. 
Given it is likely that extreme weather events will continue and possibly increase 
with climate change, this opens up the risk that any extreme weather event will 
be seen as a consequence of intentional action by States that engage in 
geoengineering. This will be the case even if the consequences are unintended. 
Since the same uncertainty about weather patterns that makes the effectiveness 
of weather modification techniques very difficult to establish will apply to the 
calculus of blame, there is no clear baseline for establishing the counter factual 
outcomes that would have occurred had geoengineering not taken place and 
indeed that make it impossible to attribute any given extreme weather event to 
anthropogenic climate change (c.f. Pielke Jr. 2010, chap.7). This raises the 
potential scenario where every extreme weather event and its consequences are 
blamed on the States involved in geoengineering activity. 
Aggrieved parties that seek revenge on the States involved will find it very 
difficult to disrupt geoengineering activities directly, as noted earlier, and may 
therefore vent their anger indirectly. For example, anger could 
be vented at the citizens or economic assets of the countries involved. The 
additional costs of protection on a global scale could therefore be very large, 
very quickly. If climate change ends up generating large impacts on peoples' 
livelihoods, it is not inconceivable that over the next few hundred years a politics 
of climate might emerge, that in turn may have violent fringes. 
There is an additional concern about the geography of blame, relating to its 
mismatch with action. When people assign blame they do so within social-ized 
normative frameworks, with blaming activity providing a public display and 
reaffirmation of those frameworks. Such frameworks rarely match the 
complexity of the underlying causes. For example, rather than recognize the 
complexity of systemic technical failures, society seeks scapegoats and blames 
individuals. Blaming affirms a hidden moral reality behind the appearance of 
social life and as a result links to trust, normative frameworks, social structures 
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and specific local, temporal concerns. In practice this can link back in a chain to 
more fundamental causes. For example, a disaster can be attributed to the 
actions of a local group, but their actions in turn can be attributed to a more 
powerful and sinister set of forces. This does not necessarily match the 
underlying causality at work. For example, currently in the Middle East blame is 
attributed to other groups, who in turn are seen as agents of other powers such 
as Israel and the USA, rather than other nations that are much more directly 
involved. 
Under such conditions the security consequences of engaging in geoengi-
neering, in a world subject to extreme weather events, for States would be 
extremely high. Moreover, for some States such as the United States, which are 
seen to have superior technological capabilities and global influence, that blame 
may be applied and acted upon, even if the USA does not engage in 
geoengineering. Put crudely, if the USA decides not to engage in geoengineering 
and the EU does, the US may well get the blame if things go wrong. Moreover, it 
may be blamed for the consequences of extreme weather events around the 
world it had no influence over. 
Even if no-one engages in geoengineering there is a significant proportion of the 
population who will believe it is ongoing anyway (Cairns, 2014b), who often 
blame the US government, and the sinister hidden organisations they believe are 
controlling its actions. While these individuals are not part of the current 
mainstream geoengineering debate, they should not be dismissed. Currently, 
some 14% of the population by some polls expresses a degree of agreement 
with the idea that the climate is being covertly manipulated for nefarious ends. 
It may be unrealistic to assume that these suspicions will not increase if solar 
geoengineering is introduced. 
 
4. Conclusion: Avoiding Dystopian Futures  
Given the very early stages of SRM research, and hence the considerable 
uncertainty about its development it is important to highlight the uncertainties 
involved in any analysis of future impacts. Caveats should be highlighted, and it 
is logically possible that none of these security concerns will arise. It may be the 
case that the world will agree on a framework for geoengineering activity and no 
country, group or individual will dissent. Similarly, the US Congress may accept 
the deployment of a climate modification system under the control of 
international organisations and subject to UN control even though they pose a 
potentially catastrophic threat to the US. Political authorities may decide 
geoengineering systems are not Critical National Infrastructure, or do not 
require extensive security oversight. Moreover, there may be global agreement 
with these actions such that security concerns are minimized. Social science 
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research on blame may be wrong and rising education levels may make it more 
'rational'. Under such circumstances scientists can get on with engineering the 
climate and not worry about the costs of indirect security. 
However, given the failures of States to agree on climate policy, the con-cerns 
raised about having US military dog training teams under UN control, the 
stability of existing security frameworks and policy, and the existing concerns 
about the social distribution of risks and rewards of geoengineering activity, it 
may be wise to be cautious. In a worst case scenario, where geo-engineering is 
unilaterally deployed without agreement and therefore imposed on an unwilling 
world that is increasingly paranoid abut extreme weather, the security 
infrastructure required would be substantial. At the extreme it may require a 
global system of surveillance and extensive interventions to protect soft targets 
around the world in a political climate where the impact of every hail storm and 
flood was being blamed on the States perceived to be undertaking 
geoengineering. The costs of such an infrastructure would not just be measured 
in percentages of GDP, but also in political terms as they would require 
substantial changes in political structures and engagements both internationally 
and at home. Global threat suppression that would have to be undertaken for 
centuries, would be subject to secretive, bureaucratic decision-making under 
conditions of uncertainty, in a world subject to paranoia, blame and 
confrontation over climate outcomes, could be very dystopian. 
Given these concerns, the widespread assumption that SRM would be 
undertaken by scientists and its indirect security impacts will be inconse-quential 
is questionable. Similarly, the implicit assumption that achieving agreement over 
global governance would be easy is questionable. Current experience suggests it 
may well be impossible, and geoengineering would have to be imposed. While 
the direct security impacts of geoengineering, through its use in military 
contexts or for the protection of facilities are likely to be slight, the indirect 
security impacts may well be much larger. Based on a series of assumptions that 
security policy changes slowly, that agreement on climate outcomes will 
continue to be difficult, and that geoengineering will make weather events 
blameworthy, the potential security costs may be large. Any security threats 
could in theory be suppressed on a global scale, but the political and economic 
costs of doing this over centuries would be significant. 
The currently widespread assumptions that geoengineering will be under-taken 
by agreement, by the scientific community, that it will be governable and subject 
to effective democratic oversight on a global scale, and then not have any 
adverse security consequence does not seem realistic. Instead, it is hard to 
avoid the conclusion geoengineering won't work, it will be un-governable (see 
also Hulme, 2014), and will have extremely costly social and economic 
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consequences of such a magnitude to make geoengineering untenable as a 
policy option. 
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